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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
OTHE.LLO HICKMAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
7303 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
·STATEMENT OF c·~sE 
This action was filed in the Third Judicial District 
Court at Salt Lake City, Utah by the plaintiff, a resident 
of Cache County, Utah, seeking to recover damages from 
the defendant as a result of injuries sustained by him when 
he drove his 1941 Buick Sedan automobile into the side of 
one of defendant's freight trains, specifically a beet car, 
which was being backed across Highway 91 about two miles 
southwest from Logan in Cache 'County, Utah. 
At the conclusion of the evidence and after both parties 
had rested, the defendant made a motion to the court re-
questing an order directing the jury to return a verdict in 
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favor of the defendant, no cause of action. The motion for 
.. directed verdict was denied by the court and the rna tter sub-
mitted to the jury which returned a general verdict in favor 
of the .defendant and against the plaintiff, no cause of action. 
From the judgment on that verdict the plaintiff has ap-
pealed. 
The statement of the facts recited by appellant in his 
brief -is in the main correct, but in some instances the ap-
pellant has misstated certain facts and .in a great many in-
stances in giving the facts appellant-.has. not stated the com-
plete facts with respect to various subjects but has stated 
only portions of the testimony favorable to appellant or as 
given by appellant himself or one or two of his witnesses, 
and has ignored or disregarded other competent testimony 
by which the jury could have found. the __ facts to be much· 
different than as stated by appellant in his brief. For that 
reason respondent will in this statement of facts include 
some ·measure of argument and point out some additional 
· facts or points where the facts differ from those as stated 
·by the p.Jaintiff. 
. At the outset, we must remind the appellant that the 
entire facts in the case must be considered and not just those 
that may be favorable to plaintiff, and not just those which 
plaintiff or his witnesses may have testified to. The jury is 
and was at liberty to believe testimony given by defendant's 
witnesses ·just as much as it was at liberty to believe plain-
tiffrs -witnesses. Also, the jury was entitled to receive in-
_:· lstruction with respect to evidence submitted by defendant 
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and testified to by defendant's witnesses even though that~ 
testimony may have been in conflict with and contrary to .1 
that which plaintiff himself or his witnesses may have testi-
fied to. 
The accident occurred on October 30, 19,47 at 6:5S P.M. 
(Tr. 167) on U. S. Highway 91, at a point approximately 
two miles southwesterly from Logan. The highway at the· 
point of the accident runs in a general northeasterly-south-
westerly direction, and the defendant's spur track crosses 
the highway at grade at approximately right angles (Tr. 
112). The highway is level and paved with concrete 22 feet _ 
in width. In addition to the concrete there is a shoulder on 
each side, and in the vicinity of the accident this slioulder .: 
is eight feet wide on each side of the concrete (Tr. 112). The 
highway runs straight for over a mile in each direction from 
the crossing. There is a railroad crossbuck sign on each side 
of the railroad track, said crossbuck sign being in each_ in-
stance on the righhand side of the highway and the near 
side of the track for approaching highway traffic. There 
is no flasher light or other protection at the crossing ex-
cept the two crossbuck signs (See Exhibit 2). 
Appellant states that the track was not in regular use, . 
but that is contrary. to other testimony, the evidence being 
that the track was used throughout the year in the shipping 
of lime rock to and from the beet dump, and that during the -
beet season there was movement every day (Tr. 381) . The 
accident occurred during the beet season and the beet switch- · 
ing movement involved was one where the railroad company 
was switching eight empty beet cars in for loading ,sug~r , 
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beets at the beet dump nearby. The plaintiff was. well ac-
quainted with the crossing and its location. 
The plaintiff with Melvin Squires, his partner in busi-
ness, was traveling along this highway toward Logan, and 
approximately three-tenths of a mile before reaching the 
spur track they passed a highway patrolman's car facing 
the opposite direction. The plaintiff testified that upon pass-
ing the highway patrolman he looked at his speedometer and 
it "showed just short of 50 miles an hour" (Tr. 228). De-
fendant's witness T'urley, who was located on the train in 
such a position that he saw a broadside view of the approach 
of plaintiff's car, stated that plaintiff was going 60 miles 
an hour ( T'r. 378). At any rate, as plaintiff passed the high-
way patrolman he watched in his rear vision mirror and 
saw that the officer turned to follow him (Tr. 2,81, 282). 
Whether it was because plaintiff was watching the officer's 
car in his rear vision mirror or otherwise, plaintiff did not 
see defendant's train entering upon the highway as soon 
as his passenger did. The passenger, Mr. Squires, first saw 
the train out in the field and then in the highway and said 
to plaintiff: "There is a train" (Tr. 305, 306). The plain-
tiff did not see the train until after Squires yelled to him: 
"There is a train coming on the highway!" (T'r. 284). The 
plaintiff testified that "this car was about half-way into 
my lane of traffic, or a little more, when I first observed it." 
·Jn other words, the freight car had proceeded more than 
half the distance over the 11 feet of the right half of the 
pavement before plaintiff saw it and had come over the 8 foot 
shoulder of the road and was about six feet onto the pave-
ment at the time Squires called plaintiff'·s attention to it 
(Tr. 324). 
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After plaintiff put on his brakes, all four wheels skidded 
for a distance of 85 feet before his car collided with the 
I 
train (Tr. 163) (Exhibit C). The plaintiff did not turn 
his car to either the right or the left but drove straight 
into the freight car and struck the freight car eight feet 
back from the forward end of the car in the direction it was 
moving (Tr. 336). The railroad car traveled 10 feet after 
the impact and in said 10 feet was brought to a complete 
stop (Tr. 3·37), and at the time the freight car came to such 
complete stop it had extended over and "was stopped just 
a little off the pavement, to the north" ( Tr. 202. See also 
Exhibit B). 
At the time plaintiff's automobile was approaching the 
crossing going to\vard Logan, one l\1rs. Afton Archibald of 
Wellsville was driving her automobile in the opposite direc-
tion coming from Logan. She also stated that she· was going 
about 50 miles an hour (Tr. 208). At the time the two auto-
mobiles were approaching the crossing, defendant's rear 
brakeman, or flagman, Frank E. Belnap, was on the high-
way at the crossing waving a light attempting to warn ap-
proaching traffic (Tr. 359). Mrs. Archibald saw brakeman 
Belnap's light when she was over 500 feet away and said 
that it appeared to be a flashlight waving up and down, and 
she "imagined" that he was waving it up and down in front 
of him (T'r. 188, 189'). Mrs. Archibald did not see the outline 
of Belnap's body until the lights of the plaintiff's car shone 
on him (T'r. 19'7), but she had seen his flashlight before that 
time. The plaintiff never did see the brakeman or his light, 
although Mr. Squires, who was plaintiff's passenger, saw 
the brakeman just shortly before the impact (Tr. 306). 
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Appellant at page 3 of his brief states that this flag-
man Belnap was standing on the west side of the pavement 
"facing" in the direction of Mrs. Archibald. That is not a 
correct statement of the facts in the record. The plaintiff's 
evidence does not show what direction Belnap was facing. 
Belnap testified he was watching plaintiff's car approach 
and attempting to flag it down. Even in her statement that 
Belnap was swinging the light up and down Mrs. Archibald 
stated she just "imagined" that it was in front of him (Tr. 
189) ; then at one place she state&, "the fellow with the flash-
light turned in my direction" (Tr. 190) ; and upon counsel's 
trying to get her to be more specific, inferring that she 
could see him facing her, counsel asked: "You say he turned 
from your direction and ran across the spur track, to the 
south side of the spur track," and her only answer was: "He 
ran toward the car coming from the other direction .. " Even 
when she turned off the highway her lights did not enable 
her to see directly which way the brakeman was facing be-
cause as she turned off the road he was running toward the 
other car and "he had moved" (Tr. 200, 201) . The only 
-time she observed him sufficiently to even tell that it was 
the form of a man at the side of the road was about the 
time that she heard the screechin~ of the brakes of plain-
tiff's car, at which time she was approximately 40 feet from 
the track, and as she turned off the road the brakeman ran 
toward the other car (Tr. 198, 200, 2:01). 
Mrs. Archibald had seen plaintiff's car coming from the 
opposite direction when she was over 500 feet from the spur 
track (Tr. 189, 190). Plaintiff saw Mrs. Archibald's car ap-
proaching, but its lights were not extra bright. The plain,; 
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tiff dimmed the lights on his automobile either before or 
just at the time he passed the policeman's car and then left 
them on dim from there on (Tr. 282). With his lights on 
dim plaintiff could see an object in front of him on the high-
way only 75 or 100 feet (Tr. 285) ; nevertheless, he contin-
ued to drive at a speed "just short of 50 miles an hour" and 
did not slow down at all until Mr. Squires yelled, "There 
is a train" (Tr. 286). 
On page 4 counsel states that at the time of the impact 
the railroad car was not half-way across the concrete pave-
ment. Mrs. Archibald did so testify, but there is other com-
petent evidence in the record from which the jury could 
believe that Mrs. Archibald was mistaken. Mr. Hickman 
testified that the freight car was more than half-way on his 
side of the pavement when he first saw it. The Hickman 
car struck the freight car eight feet from the end thereof. 
The freight car traveled only 10 feet after the impact before 
it came to rest (Tr. 337), and when it came to rest it had 
covered the other half of the highway completely and was 
just off the northwest edge of the highway (Tr. 202. See 
Exhibit B). 
Plaintiff repeats several times that it was a dark night 
and the moon had not come up. It is true that officer Reese 
so testified, but here again plaintiff disregards other com-
petent evidence which the jury was entitled to believe. The 
conductor testified that the moon was shining bright at the 
time of the accident (T·r. 349). Rear brakeman Belnap testi- · 
fied the same (Tr. 36.3), as did also head brakeman Turley 
(Tr. 378). A United States Weather Bureau Report, which 
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was introduced as Exhibit 9, giving the weather at Logan, 
Utah, certified that the moon rose there at 6:07P.M. From 
5, :00 to 6 :00 the sky was partly cloudy-not over 50 per cent. 
Betv1een 6 :00 and 7 :00 this 50 per cent cloudiness was clear-
ing up, and from 7:00 to 8:00 P. M. the sky was entirely 
clear. Thus, with the sky entirely clear by 7:00P.M., there 
could be very few clouds in the sky five minutes earlier 
when the accident happened, the accident happening at 6 :55 
(Tr. 167), and at 6:55, the time of the accident, in addition 
to the sky's being clear, the moon had been up for 48 minutes, 
and the moon rising at that time in the evening would be 
practically, if not absolutely, a full moon. At any rate, it 
was sufficient that plaintiff's passenger Squires was able 
to see the cars of the train out through the field as well as 
on the highway (Tr. 305). 
The defendant's train crew had already made some 
switching movement over and back across this highway tak-
ing some loaded cars out, and was at the time switching some 
empty cars back into the beet dump for the next day's load-
ing. As they approached the highway they brought the 
train to a co1nplete stop right at the edge of a canal bridge 
at the southeast edge of the highway, stopping the train 
before crossing the bridge (Tr. 35~6). 'The brakeman walked 
to the center of the highway, let two cars pass, and at the 
time he gave the engineer a signal to proceed across the 
highway, there was no car in sight in either direction ex-
cept a highway patrolman's car which was. southwest of 
the crossing upwards of half a mile, facing toward Wells-
ville away from the crossing (Tr. 368-370). The brakeman 
gave the engineer a signal and the engineer started the 
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train slowly across the highway. By measurement on the 
map, Exhibit 1, it will be seen that it is approximately 60 
feet from the south edge of this canal bridge to the ·center 
of the highway. Exhibit S. shows the bridge very definitely 
and the approach from that bridge to the highway. At the 
moment of impact the train was not proceeding faster than 
two miles an :p_our (Tr. 352, 3H7). Mrs. Archibald, plain-
tiff's own witness, testif~ed that when she saw the freight 
car moving over the highway it was just barely creeping 
along (Tr. 207). The plaintiff Hickman testified that when 
his lights were on bright or high beam they would show the 
full width of the road from fence. to fence. In other words, 
had he had his lights on high beam he would have been able 
to see not only the telephone poles shown at the righthand 
side of the road in the picture, Exhibit 2, but would have 
been able to see the bridges across the canal and the full 
width of the road right of way from fence to fence (Tr. 
294). 
At the outset, we wish to call to the attention of the 
court and counsel the rule that on such an appeal as this, 
where a matter has been submitted to a jury, the verdict of 
the jury must be sustained if there is any competent evi-
dence in the record to sustain it, and in order to find that 
evidence we are not bound to take-. as plaintiff and appel-
lant has done-merely evidence favorable to plaintiff or pro-
duced by his witnesses, but must take all of the evidence 
whether from plaintiff's witnesses on either direct or cross-
examination, or from defendant's witnesses on direct or 
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cross-examination, or from other testimony, including pho-
tographs· and other evidence such as the map, Exhibit 1, and 
the weather report, Exhibit 9. The rule is rather uniformly 
and universally recognized and is well stated in the case of 
Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 P. 2d 183, 184, where 
the c·alifornia Appellant Court stated: 
"In reviewing the evidence on such an appeal, 
all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respon-
dent, and all legitimate and reasonable inferences 
indulged in to uphold the verdict if possible. It is an 
elementary, but often overlooked, principle of law, 
that when a verdict is attacked as being unsupported, 
the power of the appellate court begins and ends with 
a determination as to whether there is any substan-
tial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which 
will support the conclusion reached by the jury. 
When two or more inferences can be reasonably de-
duced from the facts, the reviewing court is without 
power to substitute its deductions for those of the 
trial court.'' 
The following cases confirm the application of the fore-
going rule within the State of Utah: 
177. 
Horsley v. Robinson, .. Utah .. , 186 P'. 2d 5-92·. 
Ercanbrack v. Ellis'On, lOS. Utah 138, 134 P. 2d 
Jensen v. Logan City, 96, Utah 53, 83. P. 2d 311. 
Lym v. Thompson, .. Utah .. , 184 P. 2d 66.7. 
Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Co., 1061 Utah 
289, 147 P. 2d 875. 
Appellant uses a considerable portion of his brief ar-
guing with respect to what the defendant should have done 
under its common law duty and whether it should have put 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
out flares or other lights. He overlooks the fact that even 
if it had been determined that the defendant was negligent, 
still the jury may have determined that the plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence and may have held as they 
did on that account. We have no way of knowing now 
whether the jury determined that both plaintiff and defen-
dant were negligent or whether the jury concluded that 
plaintiff alone was negligent., The appellant in his brief 
did not say very much upon the question as to whether or 
not the facts in the record would sustain a finding of con-
tributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, even on 
the basis of an assumption that defendant was negligent. 
In examining the evidence in this case to see if there 
is any substantial competent evidence to sustain the jury's 
verdict, there are a few definite physical facts which, when 
applied to other evidence, compel the unescapable conclusion 
that regardless of whether or not the defendant was negli-
gent in any respect, the plaintiff was nevertheless guilty of 
contributory negligen~e. 
The Utah statutes in force at the time of this accident 
provided: 
"57-7-113. Restrictions as to Speed-Reasonable 
Under Conditions-Maximums. 
"(a) No person shall drive a vehicle on a high-
way at a speed greater than is reasonable and prud-
ent under the conditions and having regard to the 
actual and potential hazards then existing. In every 
event speed shall be so controlled as may be neces-
sary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or 
other conveyance on or entering the high,vay in com-
pliance with legal requirements and the duty of all 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
persons to use due care. 
"* * * 
" (c) The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent 
with the requirements of subdivision (a) of this sec-
tion, drive at an appropriate reduced speed when ap. 
proaching and crossing an inters.ection or railway 
grade crossing, when approaching and going around 
a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when travel-
ing upon any narrow or winding roadway, and when 
special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or 
other traffic or by reason of weather or highway 
conditions." 
These provisions of statute apply whether the vehicle 
is being opera ted in the daytime or the nighttime, and by 
such statute a driver who is approaching a railway grade 
crossing is put in the same class as one approaching an in-
tersection or one approaching and going around a curve 
or a hill crest, and in spite of the State maximum speed 
limits, the law requires such a d:river to drive at "an ap-
propriate reduced speed" at such times and places. 
Section 57-7-179-, Utah Code Annotated, 1943·, sets forth 
lighting equipment required on vehicles on the highway "at 
any time from a half hour after sunset to a half hour before 
sunrise." In the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on High-
ways when it wa~ enacted in 19'41, this section with respect 
to lights after sunset and before sunrise was designated as 
Section 102 .. Section 57-7-197, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
referring thereto, provides in part: 
" (a) Whenever a motor vehicle is being oper-
ated on a roadway or shoulder adjacent thereto dur-
ing the time specified in Section 102, the driver shall 
use a distribution of light, or composite beam, di-
rected high enough and of sufficient intensity to 
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reveal persons and. vehicles at a safe distance in ad-
vance of the vehicle, subject to the following require-
Inent and limitations :" 
Then follows the provision that when a vehicle ap-
proaches within 500 feet of another vehicle, the lights should 
be _dimmed by the driver. 
In the case at bar the plaintiff Hickman testified that 
·when he passed the highway patrolman, who was at least 
three-tenths of a mile from the crossing in question-or 
something in excess of 1500 feet-he dimmed his lights. He 
continued to drive toward the crossing without reducing 
his speed in any manner whatsoever, and according to his 
testimony, he continued just under the limit of 50 miles an 
hour (Tr. 282, 286). He had seen Mrs. Archibald's car 
coming, and she was at least as far away from the crossing 
as he was at the time he passed the officer because both 
were going at about the same rate 0f speed and Mrs. Archi-
bald slowed down and brought her car to a stop on the oppo-
site side of the crossing just prior to the impact. Therefore, 
at the time plaintiff dimmed his lights Mrs. Archibald was 
at least 1500 feet or more beyond the crossing-or in other 
\Vords, there was something in excess of 3000 feet separat-
ing the two automobiles-and Mr. Hickman testified that 
the lights of Mrs. Archibald's car were not extra bright (T'r. 
282). 
The statute above quoted, Section 57-7-197, requires the 
operator of a motor vehicle to "use a distribution of light, 
or composite beam, directed high enough and of sufficient 
intensity to reveal persons and vehicles at a safe distance 
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in advance of the vehicle * * *" The only exception 
authorizes and requires the driver to use the low beam or 
dimmer when within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle. Had 
the plaintiff been maintaining a proper lookout ahead instead 
of continuing at his fast rate of speed while observing in the 
rear view mirror to see if the officer was following him, and 
had he used the high beam or bright lights on his carinas-
much as he continued at the high rate of speed, he would 
have been able to see anything on the road ahead of him for 
"the full width of the road from fence to fence" (Tr. 294), 
and we must assume in absence of evidence to the contrary 
that his lights on such high beam would have revealed per-
sons or vehicles at least 350 feet ahead of him as required 
by Section 57-7-196. 
Under these circumstances it is interesting to note what 
a perusal of the pictures in evidence will show as to the view, 
and what the map, defendant's Exhibit 1, will show. Had 
the plaintiff used the high beam or bright lights as he should 
have done, continuing at the rate of speed he was going, he 
would have been able to see the defendant's train from the 
moment it started across the canal bridge 60 feet from the 
center of the pavement, assuming of course that he was close 
enough so that his bright lights would show far enough 
ahead. Clearly he could have done so at any time after he 
was within 350 feet. The freight train started from a com-
plete stop at such point of the bridge, and in traveling the 
60 feet plus until it got over the center of the highway, it 
did not move over two miles an hour. During that same 
time the plaintiff's automobile was traveling approximately 
50 miles an hour on his own testimony, or 25 times as fast 
I IIi 
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as the train. At two miles an hour the train would go ap .. 
proximately three feet per second and it would thus take 
it 20 seconds to move the 60 feet to the center of the roadway. 
The plaintiff at 50 miles an hour would move 73.33 feet 
per second and thus in 20 seconds would go approximately 
1467 feet, or considerably in excess of a quarter of a mile. 
Of course \Ve would not expect the plaintiff to see the defen-
dant's train as it started · over this canal bridge and ap-
proached the high,vay when he was a quarter of a mile away, 
but at some point after the time the defendant passed 
the highway patrolman's car - if he had been main-
taining a proper lookout ahead and not spending too much 
time looking through his rear view mirror, and if he had had 
lights which would show or reveal persons or vehicles "at 
a safe distance in advance of the vehicle" he was driving-
he could not have avoided seeing the defendant's train in 
time to bring his vehicle to a stop, disregarding any question 
of flagman or signals from any member of the train crew. 
Approaching the question from another view, the evi-
dence shows that the plaintiff's car traveled almost in a di-
rect line in the center of his lane of traffic. (See pictures, 
Exhibits C and D.) By Exhibit D it is shown that the rear 
wheels skidded slightly toward the side of the road, the skid 
marks showing that those wheels did not come as close to the 
track as the front wheels, which proceeded in a straight line. 
The plaintiff's lane of travel or half of the pavement was 11 
feet in width, and some high point on the front of his car-
apparently the radiator ornament-struck the floor sill and 
side of the beet car. This point of impact was eight feet from 
the end of the beet car (Tr. 337). Therefore, in order for 
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plaintiff's automobile to strike the beet car at such point, 
the front or end of the beet car, from a standpoint of physi-
cal fact, had to be some two or three feet over the center 
line of the pavement. This is further confirmed by the fact 
that by measurement it was determined that the beet car 
traveled just 10 feet after the impact and when it came to 
rest was some little distance over the north or northwesterly 
half of the pavement (Tr. 203). That north half of the pave-
ment being 11 feet wide and the beet car extending some 
distance beyond and having traveled only 10 feet from the 
point of impact, it is a demonstrated physical fact that the 
front end of such beet car was at least two feet or more 
over and to the northwest of the center line of the highway 
at the moment of impact. 
It was determined by the highway .patrolman from the 
damage done and other evidence at the scene of the accident 
that the speed of the plaintiff's car at the moment of impact 
was still 3.0 miles an hour (T'r. 165). Mrs. Archibald esti-
mated that such speed at the moment of impact was at least 
40 miles an hour (T'r. 2.10). The plaintiff's brother, the 
morning after the accident, stepped off the distance of the 
skid marks, and then a month or so later actually measured 
the skid marks, and at such time, a month later, by actual 
measurement he measured the skid marks at 83 feet, and he 
stated, "the skid marks are still visible today" (T'r. 148). 
On the night of the accident the highway patrolman meas-
ured these skid marks and found that the longest one was 
85 feet (Tr. 163), and that all four of the wheels had skidded 
and left visible marks upon the pavement. 
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The plaintiff produced an engineer, Professor Harold 
S. Carter, and upon putting a hypothetical question to him 
asked 'vhat rate of speed a car would have been going at 
the beginning of an 83-foot skid mark assuming that the 
speed of the car at the end of the 83-foot skid mark was 30 
miles an hour. Professor Carter stated that assuming the 
speed was 30 miles at the moment of impact after skidding 
for 83 feet, the speed at the moment of inception of the skid 
would have been 50 miles an hour (Tr. 2·48). He further 
stated that if the plaintiff's car was going 40 miles an hour 
at the moment of the impact, then the speed at the inception 
of the skid would have been 571;2 miles an hour (Tr. 2~5~0). 
It is rather interesting to note that when it was called to 
Professor Carter's attention that the skid marks were 85 
feet instead of 83 feet, and the speed at the moment of im-
pact was 30 miles per hour, he still tried to assist plaintiff 
in trying to say that it would not make much difference but 
finally admitted that 85 feet of skid marks would indicate 
a speed of 51 miles per hour. His answer was: "That two 
feet does not make much difference. The 85 feet would 
represent 51 miles an hour, to be specific" (Tr. 2~56). 
Considering the testimony of Mrs. Archibald, who es-
timated the speed at the time of the impact to be 40 miles 
an hour, and that of head brakeman Turley, who estimated 
the speed of plaintiff's car as it came along the highway to 
be 6H miles an hour, plus this admission of Professor Carter 
that 85 feet of skid marks would indicate at least 51 miles an 
hour, there was ample evidence from which the jury could 
concl ud.e that plaintiff was exceeding the speed limit of 50 
miles an hour. 
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For the purpose of further argument let us admit that 
plaintiff's speed at the moment of the inception of the skid 
was 50 miles an hour and at the moment of impact 30 miles 
an houJ::. Plaintiff would have been traveling an average 
speed of 40 miles an hour over the last 85 feet, and approxi-
mately 50 miles an hour for some distance prior to the in-
ception of the skidding of his car. At the moment of impact 
the defendant's freight car was some 121 to 14 feet from the 
southeasterly edge of the pavement, Mr. Squires testifying 
that it was at least six feet on the pavement when he yelled, 
Mr. Hickman saying it was half or more over his lane, and 
the measurement on the car indicating that the point of 
impact was at least eight feet back from the forward end. 
Assuming for purpose of argument that the front of the car 
was therefore 13 feet from the southeast edge of the pave-
ment, we would then have the following situation: the 
freight car had traveled over this 13 feet of pavement, plus 
eight feet of shoulder, at the rate of two miles an hour; at 
two miles an hour or 2.9· feet per second it would take slightly 
in excess of seven seconds for the freight car to travel this 
21 feet; at an average of 40 miles an hour, which is 58.67 
feet per second, it would take plaintiff's· automobile 1.44 
seconds to go the 85 feet through which the car skidded, 
and in the remaining time out of the seven seconds or in the 
other 5.5-6 seconds when plaintiff's car was going 50 miles 
an hour, plaintiff's automobile would have traveled over 407 
feet. Therefore, taking the evidence in the light most fav-
orable to plaintiff rather than as we are required to on this 
appeal, most favorable to the view that would uphold the 
verdict, the plaintiff in his automobile traveled over 492 
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feet while the defendant's freight car was traveling the dis-
tance of 21 feet over the 8-foot shoulder and 13 feet of pave-
ment to the point it had reached at the moment of impact. 
This disregards the additional distance of 40 feet traveled 
by the beet car from the canal bridge during which plaintiff 
should have seen the freight car approaching from the· oppo-
site side of the canal bridge had his lights shown from fence 
to fence as he said they would have done on high beam, the 
only difficulty being that plaintiff would have been so much 
farther down the highway that he would not have been close 
enough to see the freight car crossing the canal bridge no 
matter how far ahead his light may have shown. Neverthe-
less, while the freight car was traveling the 21 feet over 
the shoulder and pavement to the point of impact, plaintiff's 
automobile traveled over 492 feet. Plaintiff's witness Pro-
fessor Carter in response to a question as to the distance 
necessary to bring an automobile to a stop from 5.0 miles an 
hour answered that it would take 128 feet to bring the auto-
mobile to a stop without skidding the wheels (Tr. 248). The 
testimony also shows from Mr. Hickman himself that an 
automobile would travel 55· feet during the reaction time or 
thinking time necessary before one can apply the Brakes 
after seeing an object ahead when traveling at 50 miles an 
hour ( Tr. 288) . Thus at 50 miles an hour, if plaintiff had 
seen the train, he could have reacted and brought his auto-
mobile to a stop in 183: feet. 
Assuming again the most favorable conclusion from 
the record in favor of plaintiff, that during the last 85 feet 
he traveled an average of 40 miles an hour and approximately 
50 miles an hour prior to that time, plaintiff would cover 
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the distance of 183 feet in 2.85 seconds. (At 40 miles an 
hour it would take 1.44 seconds to go 8'5, feet and at 50 miles 
an hour it would take 1.41 seconds to go the remaining 98 
feet.) In other words, at the speed plaintiff was traveling 
under his own testimony, when combined with that of his 
expert Professor Carter, allowing reaction time and stopping 
time, he could have brought his automobile to a stop in 183 
feet, and at the speed he was traveling he covered that dis-
tance in 2.85 seconds. In 2.85 seconds defendant's train, 
going at two miles an hour, would travel approximately 8.38 
feet. The fact that the plaintiff's automobile struck the 
freight car eight feet from the end thereof shows that the 
end of this freight car was directly in front of the plaintiff 
in the center of his lane of travel at approximately the mom-
ent when plaintiff was 183 feet away, at a time when had 
plaintiff seen it he could have brought his vehicle to a stop 
and avoided the accident. 
We do not mean to hold plaintiff to mathematical ex-
actness, but during the time that the defendant's. freight 
car was proceeding over the south half of the pavement, five 
or six feet thereof, in addition to the time that the freight 
car was proceeding over eight feet of shoulder, plaintiff 
should have seen the freight car and brought his automobile 
to a stop or slowed it down so that he could bring it to a stop. 
Again we repeat, the end of the freight car was at least in 
the middle of plaintiff's lane of traffic, directly ahead of 
him, at a time when if he had looked and seen it he could 
have brought his automobile to a stop under his own testi-
mony and under that of his expert Mr. Carter. Prior to that 
time the freight car had traveled over at least 51/2 feet of 
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the pavement, and with the freight car going two miles an 
hour and plaintiff's automobile going 50 miles an hour dur-
ing the time the freight car was traveling over that 5,112 
feet, plaintiff's automobile would have been traveling over 
an additional137.5 feet. In other words, taking the figures 
and the speeds which are most favorable to plaintiff, the 
plaintiff traveled over a distance in excess of 320 feet in his 
approach to the crossing after the moment the freight car 
entered upon the actual pavement. If we add to that the 
distance of eight feet of shoulder, the plaintiff at 25· times 
the speed of the defendant's freight car would travel an ad-
ditional 200 feet, or at the moment the fre-ight car entered 
upon the shoulder adjoining the pavement, the plaintiff was 
considerably in excess of 500 feet away. If the jury believed 
brakeman Turley's testimony that plaintiff was traveling 
60 miles an hour, this distance would be much greater. 
These are mathematical calculations based upon the 
evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and in view 
of them it is inconceivable how any conclusion could have 
been reached but that the plaintiff either failed to look or 
failed to heed what he saw, or was driving at such an ex-
orbitant rate of speed that his vehicle was hurtling into the 
night far beyond the range of any safe vision which he had. 
Squires confirms Turley in indicating that plaintiff's speed 
was in excess of 50 miles an hour where he states that he took 
the plaintiff Hiclanan and his attorney to the scene of the 
accident, pointed out the approximate point where he had 
yelled to Hickman, and then with his car at 50 miles per 
hour demonstrated to them that he could stop before reach-
ing the track (Tr. 315, 316). 
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From these facts the jury was warranted in believing 
that the defendant's freight car was upon and occupying 
the highway for much more than ample time for plaintiff 
to have seen it and stopped had he been keeping a proper 
lookout with his auto under control. 
This case on these facts is not new as far as this court 
is concerned but is very similar to the case of Ha:arstrieh 
v. Oreg·on Short Line R·. Co., 70 Utah 5~52, 2162 P. 100. In 
that case it was a guest in the car rather than the driver 
.who was plaintiff, and it was determined that the driver's 
negligence could not be imputed to the plaintiff. This court 
however held that in spite of any claimed negligence on be-
half of the defendant the negligence of the driver of the 
automobile was the sole, proximate cause of the accid~nt, and 
while the court did not directly so find, it seriously ques-
tioned whether or not the defendant could have been charged 
with negligence at all. In that case the defendant railroad 
company was backing a gondola car across the highway. 
The gondola car was black and dark-the one in the case 
at bar was similar to the gondola except that it was red, 
and different from the usual gondola had high beet-rack 
sides (See Exhibit B). In that case it was claimed by the 
plaintiff that "suddenly and without any previous warning, 
whistle, bell, or other signal, defendant negligently and care-
lessly" backed a string of cars over the highway. 'lt was 
also alleged "that there was. neither switchman, brakeman, 
nor light on the said gondola car, and no flagman at said 
crossing, and when the front end of said car entered Beck 
street and crossing the said automobile was so close that 
in spite of every effort on the part of the driver of said auto-
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mobile to stop or s'verve out of the path of said gondola car, 
the said automobile collided therewith, * * * ." 
In that case the driver of the car did attempt to turn 
·with the train to try and avoid the collision. In the case at 
bar the plaintiff made no attempt whatsoever to turn in 
spite of the fact that a roadway entered the highway from 
the north with a wide graveled approach at- a 45""degree 
angle (See Exhibits 1, 2 and 3). The only explanation that 
the plaintiff in this case made concerning his failure to turn 
one way or the other was : "I did not know how far I was 
from the track and I tkoug ht I could stop" ( Tr. 2•9'5.) . (I tal-
ics ours.) 
In the Haarstrich case it was determined that the gon-
dola car was moving five or six miles an hour and the auto-
mobile in "\vhich plaintiff was riding 25· or 30. Thus it was 
determined that the automobile was traveling five times as 
fast as the freight car. In the case at bar there is no escape 
from the testimony other than to conclude that the pJain-
tiff's automobile was traveling 20 to 2:5 times as fast as the 
freight car. In the Haarstrich case the automobile struck 
the gondola 26 feet behind the front end thereof, whereas 
in the case at bar the plaintiff's automobile struck the beet 
car eight feet from the front, but by comparing the speeds 
of the freight cars and the vehicles involved, the eight feet 
in the case at bar would be comparable to five times that 
amount when comparing it with the Haarstrich case. 
Apparently in the Haarstrich case, just as in the case 
at bar, it was the guest and not the driver who saw the train 
first and yelled, "There is a train." 
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In the Haarstrich case this court said, after referring 
to speeds and distances : 
"* * * The decisive question therefore is, At 
what point on the highway was the automooile when 
the defendant's car entered upon the paved high-
way? * * *" 
Inasmuch as the automobile was traveling five times the 
speed of the freight car, it was determined that the automo-
bile was 210 feel from the crossing at the time the freight 
car entered upon the pavement. In the case at bar the mea-
surements and other testimony show that the defendant's 
be·et car had traveled at least 13 feet over the pavement at 
the point of impact, and even had the plaintiff's automobile 
been going only 40 miles an hour for the entire distance, 
that would have been 20 times the speed of two miles an 
hour which the freight car was traveling, and on that basis 
during the time the freight car traveled the 13 feet the plain-
tiff's car would travel 2;60 feet. If we take the 50l-mile an 
hour figure, the plaintiff's car was going 2:5· times the speed 
of the freight car, and while the freight car was going the 
13 feet over the pavement, plaintiff's automobile would go 
32'5- feet. If we take brakeman Turley's. testimony that plain-
tiff's automobile was going 60 miles an hour or 30 times the 
speed of the freight car, and the jury was entitled to and 
may have believed that testimony, then plaintiff's automobile 
was 390 feet from the crossing when defendant's beet car 
entered upon the pavement. And in all of this, plaintiff's 
own evidence shows that at 50 miles an hour-the speed 
he claimed to have been traveling-his automobile could 
have been brought to a stop in 128 feet plus such time as 
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was necessary for reaction, which he estimated to be 55 
feet. There is no escape from the conclusion from these 
facts that the defendant's car was upon the highway during 
the time when plaintiff was traveling at least double the 
distance which would have been necessary to react and 
bring his automobile to a stop. The conclusion of this court 
in the Haarstrich case is very applicable wherein the court 
said: 
"* * * In view of the indubitable facts dis-
closed by the evidence, it is wholly immaterial whether 
the defendant strictly complied with the law as to 
warnings and signals. Its failure in that regard, if 
there was a failure, which is very doubtful, had 
nothing whatever to do with the accident and was 
in no sense the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. 
* * *" 
The l-Iaarstrich case is so comparable in its facts to the 
case at bar that in the opinion of respondent it should be 
controlling. There are other things, however, which in re-
spondent's opinion have an additional bearing upon the 
question of the plaintiff's negligence and we think they 
should be pointed out to the court, disregarding for the 
time being any question of the defendant's negligence. 
The plaintiff himself testified, "This car was about 
half-way into my lane of traffic, or a little more, when 'l first 
observed it" ( Tr. 2,29). Therefore, the freight car had trav~ 
eled for at least six feet over the pavement before the plain-
tiff ever saw it. During this time plaintiff had been traveling 
25 times as fast as the freight car had. What had he been 
doing? Had he been looking in his rear view mirror watch-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2·6 
ing the highway patrolman, or what else had he been doing 
that had prevented him from seeing the freight car? At 25 
times the speed the freight car was traveling, the plaintiff 
had thus traveled 150 feet after the freight car entered upon 
the pavement before plaintiff saw the freight car. What 
was the reason plaintiff had not seen the approaching freight 
car while traveling over that six feet of pavement or over 
the adjoining eight feet of shoulder? Was it becaus·e plain-
tiff dimmed his lights 1500 feet away and then continued 
at 50 miles an hour while, according to his own testimony, 
his lights on dim would not show an object more than 75 
or 100 feet ahead of him on the highway, and when there 
was no approaching vehicle closer than 3,000 feet away? 
This admission on the part of the plaintiff that he traveled 
the 1500 feet to the crossing with his lights on dim without 
reducing his speed from 50 miles an hour is astounding. At 
50 miles an hour an object travels 73.33. feet a secona, and it 
takes three-quarters of a second or 5·5· feet for a person to 
react when he sees something, and yet in spite of that fact 
and in spite of the fact that it would take 128 feet to stop 
his vehicle at such speed, plaintiff continued at 50 miles an 
hour with his lights on low beam clear up to the point of the 
collision. 
c:ache County is a well known dairy section. There are 
a lot of cattle and horses in the county and in the vicinity 
where this a·ccident occurred (Tr. 288). There were homes 
in the vicinity and at least two side roads appToaching and 
intersecting Highway 91 from each direction in the immed-
iate vicinity of the crossing (T·r. 2-89, Exhibit 1). If a per-
son or an animal had been on the road, the plaintiff would 
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not have been able to stop and would have hit it just as he 
did the train. The attitude of the plaintiff is shown by the 
plaintiff's response to a question asked of him as to whether 
or not he would have hit a person if the person had been 
on the road. His answer was, "They would be able to see my 
lights," and he would depend upon their seeing his lights 
and getting out of his way ( Tr. 2.93) . The conclusion is~ in-
escapable that the plaintiff was not driving his automobile 
as a reasonable man would have done, and when there was 
no necessity under the statute to dim his lights, he dimmed 
them and continued at a high rate of speed, and contrary to 
statute, he did not, as Section 57-7 -19·7 requires, use a distri-
bution of light or composite beam directed high enough and 
of sufficient intensity to reveal persons and vehicles a suf-
ficient distance in advance of his automobile. 
Another case decided by this court that can be given ap-
plication under the facts of this case is that of Dalley v. Mid-
Western Dairy Products Co., 80 Utah 3:31, 15 P. 2d 309. The 
evidence in that case showed that the plaintiff's automobile 
was equipped with good lights and four-wheel brakes in good 
condition. His lights would disclose ordinary objects about 
100 feet ahead and 10 feet to the side of the road. Tlie trav-
eled portion of the road was about 20 feet wide, smooth and 
level. The plaintiff drove his automobile into the rear of a 
truck parked on the righthand side of the roadway with no 
lights. Plaintiff was traveling about 25, miles an hour and 
did not see the truck until he was within 15· or 20 feet of it. 
Had he seen the truck sooner he could have turned out to 
miss it or could have 'stopped. The road over which he was 
traveling was straight for a mile or more before he reached 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
the· place: where the truck was standing, and was also straight 
for a mile beyond where the truck was standing, just as was 
true in the case at bar. The highway over which he was 
traveling was much frequented; he was aware that there 
may be persons walking or riding on horseback or in horse-
drawn vehicles along the highway. He claimed to have been 
keeping a lookout ahead but nevertheless did not see the 
truck until he was 15 or 20 feet from it. 
This court sustained the trial court in granting a motion 
of nonsuit and dismissing plaintiff's complaint, and in doing 
so stated: 
"In this jurisdiction the doctrine is established 
'that it is negligence as matter of law for a person 
to drive and automobile upon a traveled public high-
way, used by vehicles and pedestrians, at such a rate 
of speed that said automobile cannot be stopped with-
in the distance at which the operator of said car is 
able to see objects upon the highway in front of him.' 
In the case of Nikoleropoulos v. Rams·ey, 6.1 Utah 465, 
214 P. 304, the language just quoted is said to be a 
correct statement of the law and that the refusal of 
the trial court to so instruct the jury was prejudicial 
error. In the case of 0' Brien v. Alston, 61 Utah 368, 
213' P. 791, 792, it is said: 
" 'But entirely apart from any statutory require-
ments, the law requires that, if a person desires to 
operate his automobile on the public streets or high-
ways after dark, he must see to it that it is equipped 
with proper, suitable, and sufficient lights, so that 
the oper~ tor may discover any objects or obstruc-
tions that may be encountered on the highway. The 
law in that regard is clearly and tersely stated in 
Serfas v. Lehigh, etc., Ry. Co., 270 Pa. 306·, 113 A. 
3f70, 14 A. L. R. 791, where the court, in speaking of 
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the duty of the operator of an automobile to have the 
same equipped with proper lights, said: 
" ' "* * * It is the duty of a chauffeur trav-
eling by nig·ht to have such a headlight as will enable 
him to see in advance the face of the highway and 
to discover grade crossings, or other obstacles in his 
path, in time for his own safety, and to keep such 
control of his car as will enable him to stop and avoid 
obstructions that fall within his vision.' " 
" 'In the case of Lauson v. Fon du Lac, (Wis.) 
123 N. W. 629, the law is stated in the headnote as 
follows: 
" ' "Independent of any statute, it is negligence 
to run an automobile on a highway at night without 
sufficient lights to enable the driver to see objects 
ahead of him in time to a void them." ' " 
(Numerous similar cases cited.) 
The plaintiff had testified that he was keeping a look-
out ahead, but the court determined that physical facts 
showed otherwise. The court stated : 
"* * * As plaintiff approached the place 
where the truck was standing on the night in ques-
tion, the highway was straight and level for a dis-
tance of at least a mile. The truck was directly in 
front of him and in his course of travel. According 
to his testimony he was keeping a constant lookout 
ahead. If he was not keeping a lookout ahead, he 
was guilty of negligence in failing to do so. There 
was nothing to obstruct his view. It was an ordinary, 
clear, quiet summer night with no moon. So far as 
appears there was nothing to divert his attention 
from the road in front of him. * * * In such 
case it must inevitably follow that plaintiff did not 
keep a lookout ahead, or, if he did, he either did not 
heed what he saw or he could not see the truck be-
cause his lights were not such as were prescribed by 
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law. No matter which horn of the dilemma is taken, 
the result is the same, viz., plaintiff was negligent. 
Had plaintiff seen the truck 50 or more feet before 
he reached the place where it was par ked, he could, 
according to his testimony, have avoided the accident. 
It follows that his failure to discover the truck sooner 
was a proximate cause of the accident and resulting 
InJury. * * * 
"What we conceive to be the weight of authority 
is in accord with the rule which prevails in this jur-
isdiction. The rule is also well established in this 
in common with other jurisdictions, that where the 
evidence relied upon by the plaintiff to establish 
some material issue of his alleged cause of action is 
inherently impossible of being true in the light of 
facts which are established beyond controversy, then 
and in such case it becomes the duty of the court to 
take the cause from the jury and deny plaintiff the 
relief prayed. Wilkinson v. O·regon Short Line R. 
Co., 35 Utah 110, 99 P. 466; Oswald v. Utah Light & 
Ry. Co., 39 Utah 2·45·, 117 P. 46,; Lawrence v. Denver 
& R. G. R. Co·., 52 Utah 414, 17 4 P. 817; 0' Brien v. 
Alston, supra; Mc·Carthy v. Bangor & Aroostook R. 
Co., 112· Me. 1, 90 A. 490, L. R. A. 19!t5B, 140." 
This Dalley v. Mid-Western case has been cited and dis-
cussed in a number of cases in this court since it was. orig-
inally given. In Hansen v. Clyde, 89 Utah 31, 56. P. 2d 1366, 
Justice Wolfe in a dissenting opinion questioned the Dalley 
v. Mid-Western decision and said: 
'' * * * When the point decided in that case 
directly comes before this court in some future case, 
I hope to pay my respects to it. * * *" 
However, in that dissenting opinion Justice Wolfe re-
ferred to the fact and made the basis of his distinction the 
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fact that in the case of Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey, 61 Utah 
465, 214 P. 304, the man struck was lawfully and rightfully 
on the highvvay, while in the Dalley case it was a violation of 
the law to have the truck as it '\Vas left on the highway. He 
said: 
"* * * I think the traveler should be given 
the benefit of some presumption that others have not 
wrongfully obstructed the highway. Be that as. it 
may, at this juncture the state of the law in this jur-
isdiction is that Bosone was negligent. * * *" 
Bosone had turned onto a new strip of highway and then 
swerved to miss an unlighted barricade which defendants 
had erected, and in swerving to the other side Bosone col-
lided with the plaintiff. 
In this Hickman case now before the court the railroad 
company was not wrongfully upon the ·highway. It was not 
violating any law in crossing the highway but had an abso-
lute right to proceed over the highway as. it was doing. 
Hickman was well acquainted with the crossing, knew it 
was there, and was bound to anticipate that trains or cars 
might be on the crossing. 
There is testimony in the case at bar from the plaintiff 
and from some of his witnesses that they did not hear any 
whistle or bell. However, the testimony of the train crew is 
very definite that the whistle was sounded as the movement 
started over the highway and that the bell was ringing con-
tinuously. It is not likely that the plaintiff did hear the 
whistle as given nor that he would have heard the ringing 
bell. The train had traveled over 60 feet after it started into 
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this highway before the collision, and at the time the train 
started, when the whistle was sounded, plaintiff would· have 
been too far away to hear it anyway, and at the speed he 
was traveling, with the hum of his tires and the roar of his 
motor, as testified to by brakeman Belnap (Tr. 358, 3-59), it 
is. very unlikely that he would have· heard a bell regardless 
of how much it was rung on the engine eight car lengths 
away from the highway. 
Plaintiff may contend that the defendant was not law-
fully on the highway, but before starting across the high-
way the train was brought to a complete stop, and the rear 
brakeman, as well as other members of the crew, gave con-
vincing testimony that no automobiles were then in sight. 
The rear brakeman himself was on the highway flagging 
approaching traffic, and according to his testimony, was 
doing all he could to warn the plaintiff and flag him down. 
The roar of the motor and the hum of plaintiff's tires called 
Belnap's. attention to the approach of the car to such an 
extent that in his efforts to flag he did not even know of 
the approach of Mrs. Archibald (T'r. 358.). If the jury be-
lieved this testimony-which they were entitled to believe--
there can be no possible doubt but what the railroad com-
pany had an absolute right to proceed as it was proceeding, 
and it was not violating any law whatsoever in doing so and 
was not guilty of negligence under the circumstances. 
Justice Wolfe in a concurring opinion in Bullock v. Luke, 
9'8 Utah 501, 98 P. 2d 350, again questions the Dalley v. Mid-
Western case and refers to his opinion in Hansen v. Clyde, 
and also to the distinction in situations whe·re the stage has 
been set (as he says referring to the Dalley case) , and where 
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the situation is a rapidly changing one. In the case at bar 
the situation was a changing one; however, with respect to 
the freight car was not changing rapidly. In the Bullock 
case Justice Wolfe stated another illustration as "where one 
enters the intersection definitely with the right-of-way and 
with due care in relation to any other also exercising due 
care and assumes his right-of-way to his injury. He should 
be allowed to recover." It is very definite that the train of 
the defendant in this case entered the intersection "definitely 
with the right-of-way and with due care in relation to any 
other also exercising due care." The defendant should be 
entitled to recover here in the sense that the claim of the 
plaintiff should not prevail. 
In the case at bar it is demonstrated that anyone else 
entering the intersection "also exercising due care" had 
nothing to fear. Mrs. Archibald was approaching this cross-
ing at the same rate of speed the plaintiff was. Mrs. Archi-
bald saw the flagman's lantern (T'r. 197) and saw the train 
in time to bring her vehicle to a stop and to avoid any col-
lision with it, and Mrs. Archibald saw the outline of the 
train or the approaching car because plaintiff's lights shown 
upon it (Tr. 1901;2, 207), and also saw brakeman Belnap 
because plaintiff's lights shone upon him (Tr. 19'7). Thus 
plaintiff's lights would include some spread of the highway 
even though he testified that on dim, as he was traveling, 
they would show only 75 to 100 feet ahead. 
In the Bullock case Justice w·olfe went on to say: 
"In this case Bullock was driving per se negli-
gently; that is, in relation to another exercising due 
care. His driving would have been negligent if Luke 
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had been nowhere near, although it might then have 
resulted in no harm. * * *" 
In this Hickman case it would have been negligence for 
Hiclonan to drive as he did even if the train had been no-
where around or if the beet car struck had instead been a 
person or an animal. 
In the case of Niels·en v. Watanabe, 90 Utah 401, 62 P. 
2d 117, where the question was raised on demurrer, the 
plaintiff had collided with a parked truck immediately after 
. being blinded by the lights of another car. This court said 
of the D~alley case and other similar cases : 
"* * * None of the cited cases are control-
ling of the case at hand. The complaint here ques-
tioned is silent as to whether the highway near where 
the truck was par ked is straight or crooked, level, or 
otherwise. If the truck could not, because of some 
obstruction, be seen as plaintiff and her husband ap-
proached it prior to the time they were blinded, and 
if plaintiff's husband was driving at a lawful rate 
of speed an automobile properly equipped with lights 
and brakes without any reason to believe the head-
lights of another automobile would suddenly or un-
expectedly blind him; that while so blinded the col-
lision occurred without time for him to reduce his 
speed or stop his automobile, the rule announced in 
the cases relied upon by defendant and heretofore 
cited in this opinion would not apply. Under such 
circumstances it may not be said that plaintiff's hus-
band was, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory 
negligence. * * *" 
On the other hand, if one is momentarily blinded and 
does have time to reduce his speed or stop and fails to do so, 
i il 
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then he can be held guilty of negligence as a matter of law. 
What then would be the rule with respect to a man who is 
not blinded by the lights of an approaching automobile but 
'vho, when an automobile is 3000 or more feet away from 
him, dims his lights so he can see only 75 to 100 feet ahead 
of him and then without slackening speed, hurtles through 
the night at a speed of 50 miles an hour or more into collision 
with something that had he not had his lights on dim or had 
he slackened his speed when he dimmed his lights, he would 
have seen in ample time to have brought his. car to a stop 
without any difficulty. Respondent earnestly contends that 
under such a situation such a driver should be held contrib-
utorily negligent as a matter of law. In the case at bar, how-
ever, in spite of a motion for directed verdict, the court sub-
mitted the n1atter to a jury, and the jury, either on the basis 
of sole negligence on the part of the plaintiff or at least on 
the basis of contributory negligence, decided against him. 
In spite of the questions that have been raised with re-
spect to the Dalley v. Mid-Western case, it has not as yet 
been overruled but some of, these distinctions have been 
pointed out. 
In the case of Moss v. Christensen-Gardner, Inc., 98 
Utah 253, 98 P. 2d 3.63, this court refers to and quotes from 
the Watanabe case and also refers to the, rule of the Dalley 
case. The rule of the Dalley case was not changed there. It 
was not overruled but distinguished from the facts set up 
in the Moss case. 
In Olson v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 98 Utah 2:08, 98 
P. 2d 944, which involved running into a caboose standing 
across a city street in Price, the trial court had given judg-
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ment for the plaintiff. This court reversed the trial court, 
citing both the Haarstrich case and the Dalley case, as well 
as the Ramsey case. This court in citing the Dalley and 
Ramsey cases said : 
"* * * While a railroad company is not ex-
cused from exercising reasonable care to prevent col-
lisions and while many conditions may exist which 
should put them on notice that motorists might be 
endangered and therefore enjoin on them the positive 
duty to give warning, yet when they are using their 
right-of-ways in a careful and lawful manner they 
have a right to presume that motorists on crossing 
streets will proceed carefuUy· and lawfully and wiU 
drive with their c·ars in such control as to be able to 
stop· within the distance at which they can S'ee objects 
ahead. * * * We hold in conformance with 
what appears to us to be the great weight of author-
ity that the presence of a train on a track itself fur-
nishes a warning to motorists, unless conditions exist 
which should cause the train crew to realize that 
motorists might not see the cars, in which event 
some additional warning may be required to satisfy 
the standard of due care." (Italics ours.) 
In this Hickman case there was competent evidence from 
which the jury could conlude that the night was a bright 
moonlight night, the sky was clear and the moon had been 
up for approximately an hour (Exhibit 9). The train crew 
stopped the train movement as it came to the edge of the 
highway right-of-way and then proceeded very slowly, evi-
dently having in mind that at the slow speed an approach-
ing vehicle could more than likely pass around the end of 
the car if it ':Vas coming too fast to stop, and if not, and if 
the ·cars had proceeded far enough across the highway to 
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block it, then any approaching vehicle with proper lights, 
driving at a proper rate of speed, should be able to see the 
cars upon the highway. This was not all. The rear brake-
man stopped the movement and let some approaching auto-
mobiles go by so that when he started the movement across 
there was not an automobile in sight upon a straight street 
extending over a mile in either direction (T'r. 35·6, 3·57). 
That was not all. The brakeman stood on the highway-it 
matters not whether the center or the edge-and waved his 
lantern, and from the testimony of brakeman Belnap the 
jury had competent evidence, if it chose to believe it, from 
which it could conclude that the brakeman did all he could 
in v1aving the lantern so that approaching vehicles from 
either direction could see it (Tr. 361). Brakeman Belnap 
continued to \vave such lantern until, as he said, "I got out 
of his way and kept from getting killed" ( Tr. 363) . 
The most recent case in which the Dalley v. Mid-West-
ern Dairy case has been referred to is the case of H ovrsley 
v. Robinson, .. Utah .. , 186· P. 2d 5·92 .. In that case the 
defendant's bus vvas being operated on a highway at such 
a speed that it could not be stopped when an automobile 
·- · · skidded in front of it. Referring to the Nikoleropoulos v. 
Ramsey case, the court said : 
"* * * We held that defendant was negli-
gent as a matter of law, no matter how dark and 
stormy the night or how bad the visibility, if he 
drove at such a rate of speed that he was unable to 
avoid running plaintiff down within the distance 
plaintiff could be seen walking ahead of defendant's 
car on the highway. To the same effect see: Dalley 
v. Mid!-Western Dairy Produc-ts Co., 80 Utah 331, 
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15, P. 2d 309~; Hamrstric'h v. Oregon Short Line R. 
Co., 70 Utah 5,5,2, 262 P. 100; O'Brien v. Alston, 61 
Utah 368, 2:13 P. 791." 
This court further stated in the case of Horsley v. Rob-
inson: 
"The Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey case is in sub-
stance a holding that it is negligence to operate ave-
hicle on the highvv-ay at any time without having it 
under sufficient control so that others using the 
highway will not be unreasonably endangered there-
by, regardless of how slow it is required to travel to 
acco1n plish that end. If that is the rule where visi-
bility is involved, it follows that the same rule ap-
. plies where the lack of control which endangers 
others is the result of slippery roads and stormy 
conditions. * * *" 
If that is the rule where visibility is involved, then the 
rule should be directly applicable to this Hickman case where 
on a man's own testimony he dimmed his lights contrary 
to statute when there was no necessity to do so and contin-
ued traveling at a speed of 50 miles an hour when with such 
dimmed lights he ·could only see 7S to 100 feet ahead of him, 
and neither turned his lights back to high beam nor slack-
ened the speed of his car until it was too late to avoid a 
collision with de!endant's train, which had completely cov· 
ered his side of the highway and ·a portion of the- other side. 
Under the Haarstrich ·case, and under the Dalley case 
as it has been discussed and referred to in these other cases, 
the plaintiff, Othello. Hickman~ should have been held guilty 
of negligence as a matter of law on his own testimony. 
Clearly when the matter was submitted to a jury and a jury 
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decided against him, there is more than substantial evidence 
in this record to sustain the verdict of the jury and the 
judgment based thereon. 
In addition to the foregoing cases, we wish to call the 
court's attention to the following cases decided in this court, 
all of which would have some bearing upon the issues herein 
and would assist this court in determining whether or not 
from the evidence introduced at the trial there was sufficient 
to warrant a jury in finding that the plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence : 
Nabrotsky v. Salt Lake & Utah R. Co., 1031 Utah 
274, 135 P. 2d 115. 
Nuttall v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 98 Utah 
383, 99 p. 2d 15. 
Drummond v. Union Pacific R. Co., .. Utah .. , 
177 P. 2d 903. 
Van Wa-goner v. Union Pacific R. Co., .. Utah 
.. , 186 P. 2d 293. 
Similar cases from other jurisdictions upon the same 
subject matter are very numerous, but we cite the following 
as a few which may be of some assistance to the court : 
Sailors v. Lowden, (Neb.) 299 N. W. 510. 
Shepard v. Thompson, (Kan.) 109, P. 2d 12~6·. 
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Reynolds, (Ky.) 202 
s. w. 2'd 99'7. 
Fleming v. Loch, (Okla.) 195, P. 2d 942. 
Kurn v. Jones, (Okla.) 101 P. 2d 242. 
Kennedty v. Laramee, (Vt.) 61 A. 2d 547. 
Jones v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (Del.) 61 A. 2d 
691. 
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Chicago, B. & Q·. R. Ca. v. Ruatn Transpor'bation 
Corp., (8th Circuit Iowa) 171 F. 2d 781. 
Evans v. Georgia Northern R. Co., (Ga.) 52- S. 
E. 2d 28. 
Cleveland, C. C. & S't. L. Ry. Co. v. Gillespie, 
(Ind.) 1'73 N. E. 708. 
s·chrader v. N. Y. C. & St. L. R. Co., (N.Y.) 172 
N. E. 2;72·. 
Doty v. Southern Pa.cific, (Ariz.) 12:9· P. 2d 991. 
With respect to the question of defendant's ·negligence, 
we would like to refer the court to the complaint. In para-
graph II of the complaint, page 1 of the transcript, the plain-
tiff charges the defendant with negligence "in that it failed 
to keep . a careful or any lookout for automobiles crossing 
said track, in failing to observe Plaintiff's said automobile 
and in failing to have any light on said train ; that Defen-
dant was further careless and negligent in the operation of 
said locomotive and train in not causing the bell upon said 
locomotive to be rung, or its whistle or siren blown, or to 
give any other signal or warning of the presence or approach 
of said locomotive train and cars at any point within sight 
or hearing of said crossing." 
There is testimony from the defendant's witnesses 
which cannot be disputed that the bell was being rung con-
tinuously. The fact the plaintiff and his witnesses did not 
hear it would not be controlling because the testimony does 
not show that any of such witnesses were in a position to 
have heard the bell, and lack of whistle or bell could not have 
been in any way a proximate cause of the accident involved 
in this case. 
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It is charged that the defendant "failed to keep a careful 
or any lookout." There is no evidence of failure to keep or 
maintain any lookout. On the contrary, the only evidence 
in the case indicates that there was a careful lookout kept 
and maintained by all the members of the crew. They 
stopped at the edge of the highway to let approaching traffic 
go by, and as the movement started no car was in sight in 
either direction. The flagman Belnap observed plaintiff's 
car coming and tried to flag him. The head brakeman ob-
served the car and watched it, estimating the speed as it 
traveled broadside to his view to be 60 miles an hour. The 
engineer saw and observed the approaching automobile. 
All of the testimony indicates that a careful lookout was 
kept. 
With respect to this question of lookout, we would like 
to refer the court to the case of Van Wag'Oner v. Union 
Pacific R. Co., . . Utah .. , 186 P. 2d 29'3·, where it was 
claimed that a proper lookout was not maintained, and 
wherein this court held that the only direct evidence in this 
case indicated that the train crew was keeping a proper 
lookout. 
This leaves the charges of negligence in plaintiff's com-
plaint as being only "failing to have any light on said train 
* * * or to give any other signal or warning of the pres-
- ence or approach of said locomotive train and cars at any 
point within sight or hearing of said crossing." 
The law does not require that defendant have lights 
, on its freight trains. However, if there is no light, and if 
circumstances and conditions are such as would require more 
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than statuto-ry warnings, the matter may be submitted to 
a jury for a jury to determine if the railroad ·company should 
have done something more th~n it did do to warn approach-
ing travelers and give them protection at the crossing. In this 
case there was competent testimony which the jury could 
have believed that a flagman was on the crossing with his 
brakeman's lantern doing all he could to warn approaching 
traffic, and particularly the plaintiff. Thus-, from the evi-
dence in this case on this question of the failure to do some-
thing more, there was ample evidence from which the jury 
·could have believed that the defendant railroad company did 
attempt to give warning and did all that was reasonably nec-
essary of it, and the jury from such evidence could thus have 
found that the defendant was not negligent in any respect. 
REPLY TO AP·PELLANT'S ARGUMENT' UNDER 
SPECIFIC ASSIGNME.NT:S OF' ERROR. 
kS8IGNMENTS 1 AND 2 CONC'E.RNING ADMISSI-
BILITY OF PHOTOGRAPHS. 
In his assignments of errors Nos. 1 and 2, appellant com-
plains that the court erred in admitting over plaintiff's ob-
jection the pictures introduced as. defendant's Exhibits 2, 
3, 4, 5 and 6, and in refusing to strike the photographs from 
the record after their admission. 
The witness Benny Degn, a photographer produced by 
plaintiff himself, admitted that the . Exhibits- 2, 3, 4, 5· and 
6 were a fair representation of the surrounding territory 
and approach to the crossing at the time of the accident 
(Tr. 130-134). Plaintiff's brother, V. L. Hickman, admitted 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
43 
the same \vith respect to Exhibit 2 (Tr. 146). The defen-
dant produced M. E. Goodnow, who had been up to the scene 
of the accident shortly after it occurred, and he likewise 
stated that the pictures fairly reflected the view one could 
see at the time of the accident (T'r. 382). 
Wigmore, Third Edition, Vol. III, Sec. 792., page 178: 
"A photograph, like a map or diagram, is a wit-
ness' pictured expression of the data observed by 
him and therein communicated to the tribunal more 
accurately than by words. lts use for this purpose 
is sanctioned beyond question." 
And again in subparagraph (3) of Sec. 792, page 185: 
"The objection that a photograph may be so 
made as to misrepresent the object is genuinely di-
rected against its testimonial soundness ; but it is of 
no validity. It is true that a photograph can be de-
liberately so taken as to convey the most false im-
pression of the object. But so also can any witness 
lie in his words. * * * If a qualified observer 
is found to say, 'This photograph represents the fact 
as I saw it,' there is no more reason to exclude it 
than if he had said, ~The following words represent 
the fact as I saw it,' which is always in effect the 
tenor of a witness' oath. * * *" 
The question of admissibility of such photographs was 
passed upon favorably by this court in a rather early case. 
The case of Dederichs v. Salt Lake City R. Co., 14 Utah 137, 
46 P. 656, involved a collision between an electric traction 
car and a horse and wagon. The matter was tried twice and 
came to this court on appeal twice. On the second trial the 
defendant offered in evidence three photographs showing 
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the surroundings and locality where the accident had oc-
cured. These photographs had been taken three and one-half 
years after the accident, hut the plaintiff testified that there 
was 'no difference in the conditions existing at the time the 
pictures were taken from those surrounding the accident 
at the time it happened "and that the situation was the 
same as shown on the photographs that it was at the time 
of the accident. * * * These photographs exhibited 
the surface condition of the streets, buildings, trees, cars, 
railroad track, poles, and distances * * · *" The trial 
court on objection refused to admit the photographs in evi-
dence and the case was appealed on this ground alone and 
reversed by this court. This court held such photographs 
to be admissible on the basis that they had been verified 
by the testimony of -vvitnesses to be a correct representation 
of the locality of the accident. ln that connection this court 
stated: 
"If any difference had arisen concerning the 
photographs being taken at a different season of the 
year, it could have been explained. * * *" 
The same ruling was. made by this court in the case of 
Johns,on v. Union Pacific R. Co., 35· Utah 285, 100 P. 3,90. 
Counsel has not found many cases where the matter has 
been raised before this court. However, the question has 
been raised numerous times in other jurisdictions. A recent 
Montana case, Pilg,eram v. Haas, (Mont.) 167 P. 2d 339~, in-
volved a highway collision between plaintiff's automobile 
and defendant's large truck-trailer combination. The trial 
court there admitted in evidence photographs of the vicinity 
where the collision occurred, and on appeal this was charged 
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as error. The Montana Supreme Court held the photographs 
were properly admitted, stating with respect to the witness 
who identified the photographs : 
"* * * He further testified that although he 
did not take the photograph if was nevertheless a 
correct representation of the surface of the highway 
at and near the place of the collision in the evening 
of the 25th day of May, 1942. Where the nature or 
condition of a place becomes a matter of controversy 
in a civil action, photographs of the place shown to 
be true representations of it at the time in question 
are generally admissible in evidence. Photographs 
may be proved to be correct representations by wit-
nesses other than the _person who took them. * * *" 
In the case at bar plaintiff complains that one of the 
witnesses testified that at the time of the accident brush 
along the track was high. If plaintiff had contended that 
because of high brush along the railroad right-of-way out 
in the field he was unable to see the . train, then plaintiff 
might have some reason to complain, or at least show by his 
own testimony that conditions were different than shown 
in the photographs, but plaintiff never c~ntended that any 
high brush or weeds out in the field prevented him from 
seeing the train. He never saw the train out in the field at 
all although his passenger Mr. Squires did, and the weeds 
and brush did not prevent Mr. Squires from seeing the train 
out in the field. Any weeds or brush could have no effect 
upon the view plaintiff would have had after the train 
started over the canal bridge, nor after the train started 
over the shoulder of the highway, nor at any time after the 
car started over the pavement, and the car had proceeded 
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over eight feet of the shoulder of the highway and six feet 
of pavement while plaintiff was going 3~50 feet in his auto-
mobile before plaintiff ever saw the car at all. 
We think the above cases sufficiently answer assign-
ments of error Nos. 1 and 2,, but for the court's convenience 
we refer also to the following cases: 
Mason v. Allen, (Ore.) 195 P. 2d 717. 
Barone v. Jones, (C'al.) 176: P. 2:d 392, 177 P. 2d 
30. 
Hisaw v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., (Okla.) 
16~9 P. 2d 281. 
PLAINT'IFF'S ASSIGNMENTS O·F ERR.QR. NOS. 3 
AND 4 WITH R.EFER.E;N,CE TO T'HE COURT'S IN-
STRU~c·T'IONS NOS. 7 AN·D 9. 
Appellant complains of the latter portion of instruc-
tion No. 7, but vve would like to refer the coHrt to the first 
·paragraph of instruction No. 7, which in the opinion of re-
spondent places a greater burden upon the railroad com-
pany than is provided by law. At any rate, in the first para-
graph of No. 7 the court sets forth responsibilities of the 
defendant railroad company for the exercise or due care and 
instructs the jury that a failure to keep the train under con-
trol and anticipate the presence of others or to otherwise 
fail to exercise due care is negligence. The full last para-
graph of instruction No. 7 reads: 
''You are instructed that when a railroad com-
pany is using its right-of-way in a careful and lawful 
manner the employees in charge of its trains have 
a right to presume that motorists approaching on 
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streets or highways which cross the railroad track 
'viii proceed carefully and lawfully, and the railroad 
company's employees have a right to presume that 
motorists on the highway will drive with their cars 
under such control as to be able to stop within the 
distance at which they can see objects ahead." 
Appellant also con1plains in assignment of error No. 4 
that the latter portion of instruction No. 9 was error. How-
ever, we should read instruction No. 9 as a whole, which is 
as follows: 
"You are instructed that where a train crew is 
engaged in a switching movement, such as is involved 
in this case, the laws of Utah do not require the train 
crew to put out flares on a highway when crossing 
such highway ·at night, nor do they require cars in 
such train to be lighted or carry any lights upon 
them. Reasonable care, however, is required and it 
is for you to determine from all of the facts and cir-
cumstances, whether the defendant used reasonable 
care in the efforts of its employees at the highway 
crossing as the train moved into the crossing. After 
the cars of such a train are upon and occupying or 
passing over a highway the presence of such train 
or cars lawfully upon such highway is a sufficient 
warning to approaching travelers and such travelers 
on the highway are bound to see such train of cars 
on the highway in time to stop and to avoid colliding 
therewith." 
It will be noted that in both instruction No. 7 and in-
struction No. 9 the court prefaces the particular wording 
complained of by appellant with an instruction that "when 
a railroad company is using its right-of-way in a careful 
and I awful manner" * * * "the presence of such train 
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or cars lawfully upon such highway is a sufficient warning 
I 
to approaching travelers * * *" 
Appellant states that the foregoing instructions when 
read together "assume that the train was on the crossing 
all the time while the plaintiff was a sufficient distance 
away from the crossing to have looked and stopped before 
colliding with the defendant's train. They also assume that 
the railroad cars were lawfully upon the highway." Counsel 
over looks the other portions of both of the instructions men-
tioned which state that the defendant was. to use reasonable 
care as the train moved into the crossing and that if the 
defendant failed to exercise such care in the operation of 
the train at the time of the accident, such failure was negli-
gence .. These statements are included in the identical instruc-
tions of which plaintiff complains and the instructions when 
read as a whole do not assume anything. There was evidence 
in the record from which the jury could have found the facts 
in accordance with defendants theory that the train was on 
the highway for sufficient time for plaintiff to have seen 
it and stopped therefore it was proper for the court to in-
struct the jury as it did. 
We would like to point out to counsel that in the in-
structions given by a court, the court is required to instruct 
not only upon any theory of the case which a plaintiff may 
have but also upon a defendant's theory of the case, assum-
ing proper requests for such instructions are given. Any 
litigant is entitled to have his theory of the case submitted 
to the jury. This principle is so well recognized that it would 
seem to be unnecessary to cite authority with respect thereto. 
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However, we do call the court's attention to the following 
·cases: McDonald v. Union Pacific R. Co., 109 Utah 4'9'3, 167 P. 
2d 685; Pra-tt v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 57 Utah 7, 16H P. 
· 868; Morgan v. Bingham Stage Line Co., 75, Utah 87, 2183 P. 
: 160; and Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P. 2d 772 .. 
The instructions as given did not assume the facts to 
be one way or the other, but such instructions did allow the 
~ jury to determine what the facts were with respect to the 
- matters referred to. It was for the jury to determine whether 
- the defendant used reasonable care in entering upon the 
4 highway with its train, and also for the jury to determine 
:.. whether such train or car was upon the highway for suf-
~ 
- ficient length of time that the plaintiff should have seen it 
-
~~ in time to have brought his automobile to a stop to avoid 
~= colliding therewith. The evidence from the plaintiff himself, 
I: as well as that from other witnesses, was. ample to form a 
ii basis from which the jury could determine that the particu-
:~ lar car which plaintiff ran into was upon the highway for a 
c· sufficient length. of time for plaintiff to have seen it and 
~ stopped. The defendant's theory of the case was and is that 
t defendant's beet car had entered upon the paved portion of 
the highway and had been upon such highway for a suffi-
~· cient length of time that had plaintiff been driving at a 
~ 
~· reasonable rate of speed with his. automobile under proper 
I>' 
.;.; control and with proper lights, plaintiff would have seen the 
v 
_., freight car in plenty of time to have brought his automobile 
~·to a stop. That being the case, the employees of the railroad 
.r::: 
:-;..company were entitled to assume that plaintiff would have 
!'!II>' 
··.his car under control and would be able to stop within the 
;.~ distance at which he could see objects ahead. This being 
~:,, 
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defendant's theory, the defendant was entitled to have the 
case presented to the jury upon that theory and the jury 
was entitled to be instructed with respect thereto. If plain-
tiff takes issue with the law as stated in instruction No. 7 
' 
we will merely repeat the quotation given hereinabove from 
O·lson v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 98 Utah 208, 98 P. 2d 944, 
with respect to railroads at such crossings, that "when they 
are using their right-of-ways in a careful and lawful manner 
they have a right to presume that motorists on crossing 
streets will proceed carefully and Ia wfully and will drive 
with their cars in such control as to be able to stop within 
the distance at which they can see objects ahead." 
Instruction No. 7 uses that language almost verbatim 
and specifically prefaces. it with the words, "when a rail-
road company is using its right-of-vvay in a careful and law-
ful manner." 
In answer to plaintiff's argument on page 10 of his 
brief that "there is no evidence in the record that defendant's 
train was occupying or passing over the highway before 
plaintiff applied his brakes," we merely refer to the physical 
facts· and measurements and the argument with respect 
thereto as already given earlier in this. brief. Those facts 
as well as plaintiff's own testimony give overwhelming evi-
dence that defendant's train was occupying and passing over 
the highway for a considerable time before plaintiff applied 
his brakes. 
Plaintiff cited the case of Earle v. Salt Lake & Utah R. 
Corp., 109 Utah 111, 165 P. 2d 877. That case did not in-
volve the driver of the car. The question there was solely one 
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as to whether the guests riding in the car were guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law, and the court 
held that with respect to such guests the question of their 
contributory negligence was for the jury ; as. also the ques-
tion as to whether or not the negligence of the driver was 
the sole proximate cause was held for the jury. In that case 
it was assumed that the driver himself was negligent, but 
whatever he did or what he may have seen at the time of the 
accident was not in evidence. He did not even appear at 
the trial. In that Earle case at page 881 this court held: 
"* * * The duty of a driver to see a train 
that is approaching a crossing but not in the inter-
section is not as great as it is to see a train which 
is on the crossing all the time while he travels an 
ample distance to see and stop. * * *" 
The physical facts and measurements already referred 
to herein show that the beet car was on the paved portion 
of the highway during a time that plaintiff traveled over 
twice the distance necessary for him to have brought his 
automobile to a stop. 
Respondent has no quarrel with the law as cited by ap-
pellant to the effect that where there is no evidence an in-
struction, even though it may be abstractly correct, should 
not be given, and the cases referred to by counsel-all of 
them-directly state that there was no evidence on the point 
upon which the instruction was given. In this case there is 
ample evidence, which the jury was entitled to believe and 
was entitled to be instructed upon, showing that the freight 
car was on the highway in front of the plaintiff in ample 
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time for plaintiff to have seen it and brought his automobile 
to a stop. Therefore, there was evidence in this case to which 
the instructions directly applied and evidence upon which 
the jury was entitled to be instructed under defendant's 
theory of the case. 
With reference to the cases cited by appellant on pages 
12 and 13, we call the court's attention to the fact that only 
a few of those cases involved personal injuries, and of those 
that did, there is not one wherein the driver of the vehicle 
was the plaintiff, so except for the admitted rule that there 
must be evidence in a case to warrant instructions, the cases 
are not in point in any manner, and in most of those cases 
the courts. found that there was no evidence either showing 
or tending to show the rna tters covered by the instructions. 
That is not the case here. 
In addition to the cases here cited, we wish to refer 
the court to the Haarstrich case, the Dalley case, and other 
cases. cited earlier in this brief. 
We submit that the court did not err in giving instruc-
tions 7 and 9 as complained of by plaintiff. 
PLkl'NTIF'F'S ASSIGNMENT OF' ERR·OR. NO. 5 
c:o:Nc:ERNING COUR'T'S INSTRU·CTION N:Q. 18. 
In his argument with respect to instruction No. 18 ap-
pellant, quibbles over the use of words. Respondent feels 
that questioning the use of the word "that" in the beginning 
of each subparagraph of instruction No. 18 amounts to use· 
less. quibbling. The court in that instruction says that IF 
the jury found plaintiff to be contributorily negligent, the 
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jury must find that one or more of the other matters were 
true. That is merely another way of stating, "You cannot 
find the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence unless 
you find that the plaintiff did so and so or failed to do so and 
so." The prefacing of the whole instruction by the words 
"if you find" submitted the matter to the jury for the jury's 
determination and did not suggest that the jury should or 
should not so find, but told the jury that it could not so find 
the plaintiff to be contributorily negligent unless it found 
that one or more of the matters stated in the subparagraphs 
were true. 
Yvith respect to plaintiff's argument on subparagraph 
(a), we are very much surprised at plaintiff's insistence 
that the jury must believe a certain matter to be true be-
cause plaintiff's witness so testified even though other 
witnesses may have testified to the contrary. Appellant 
states that the "evidence clearly showed * ~ * that the 
employee did not turn his light in the direction from which 
plaintiff was approaching until after plaintiff had applied 
his brakes." Appellant forgets that defendant's witness 
Belnap is entitled to be considered by the jury and that such 
witness testified that he never even saw Mrs. Archibald ap-
proach because he was focusing his attention on the plain ... 
tiff, but nevertheless was swinging his lantern in a hori-
zontal position so that it could be seen from each direction, 
and as the plaintiff approached closer he even ran in plain-
tiff's direction. Again we repeat the jury was entitled to 
believe the witness Belnap, and if the jury did believe the 
witness Belnap then they were entitled to find exactly as 
was stated in subparagraph (a). 
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With respect to subparagraphs (d) ani (e), appellant 
complains that the jury may have found that plaintiff was 
exceeding the speed limit and appellant states: "Yet the 
evidence in the record shows that he was driving between 
4'5 and 50 miles per hour, a legal rate of speed." Again we 
must inform appellJant that he cannot ignore evidenc·e that 
is not fav'orable to him. The plaintiff's own witness, Mr. 
Carter, by his testimony gave sufficient basis for the jury 
to find that the plaintiff was going at least 51 miles an hour 
-even if he was going only 30 miles an hour at the point of 
impact and not 40 as testified to by Mrs. Archibald. The 
witness Turley, who observed the approacli of plaintiff's 
car with a broadside view, testified that plaintiff was going 
60 miles an hour. AGAIN WE MUST R.E,MIND PLAIN-
TIF'F T'HE JURY WAS ENTITLED TO BE.LIEVE THE 
WIT'NE:SS TUR.LEY, AND IF T'HE JURY DID 80, THERE 
IS NO' REASON WHY THIS ~COURT ·S:H·OULD OVER-
RU,LE THEM IN T'HE MATTER. 
With respect to subparagraph (g), plaintiff contends 
that such paragraph assumes that the trait! was plainly 
visible to plaintiff. Subparagraph (g) does not so assume, 
but there was evidence in the record as shown by the mathe-
matical calculations given earlier in this brief, from which 
the jury could believe that the train was plainly visible to 
the plaintiff for a sufficient time that he could have stopped, 
and the jury was entitled to find that as a fact, and in in·, 
struction No. 18 they were told, if you find that such was 
a fact then plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 
Appellant says. subparagraph (h) assumes that because 
the plaintiff did not expect the train to be on the track that 
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for that reason he failed to keep a proper lookout. Subpara-
graph (h) does not so assume, but the evidence shows that 
plaintiff's guest saw the train both in the field and on the 
highway before plaintiff did. It shows from plaintiff's own 
testimony that the freight car was more than half way on 
plaintiff's side of the pavement before plaintiff saw it, and 
it also shows that plaintiff had at least sometime during 
the progress toward the track been looking in his rear view 
mirror watching the approaching officer. From this evi-
dence the jury was entitled to find, if they so believed, that 
the plaintiff was not keeping a proper lookout ahead. He 
knew of the presence and location of the railroad track. The 
fact that he did not expect the train to be there-taken into 
consideration with his looking into the rear view mirror, 
and other circumstances-formed a sufficient basis to allow 
the jury to find that he was not keeping a proper lookout 
ahead. As we stated hereinabove under the discussion with 
respect to plaintiff's assignments Nos. 3 and 4, the defen-
dant is entitled to have its theory of the case submitted to 
the jury, and where there is evidence in the record, the jury 
is entitled to be instructed with respect to such evidence if 
they find such evidence to be true. 
The jury was not in any manner instructed that they 
should find that any one of the subparagraphs (a) to (h) 
was true, but there was sufficient evidence which, if the 
jury chose to believe it, t4ey could have believed that any 
one or all of such conditions were true, and as a preface to 
the entire instruction No. 18, instead of directing the jury 
to so find, the court said, IF YOU FIND that the plaintiff 
was contributorily negligent, then you must find that it was 
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because one or more of the following matters, which were 
amply covered by testimony in the record, were true. 
Defendant submits that the court did not err in giving 
instruction No. 18. 
APP'ELLANT'S ASSIGNMENT OIF ERROR NO. 6 
C,QNCERNING COURT'S REFUSAL T,O GIVE PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1. 
In Instruction No. 1 as requested by plaintiff, the plain-
tiff asked the court to instruct the jury that if they found 
from the evidence that the defendant failed to exercise 
proper care "either in maintaining a lookout for approach-
ing traffic or in a failure, if any, to give any signal or warn-
ing of the presence or approach of the train of cars attached , 
to its said locomotive," then such failure would be negli-
gence. 
Respondent questions very much the propriety of giving 
an instruction which would have allowed the jury to find 
that the defendant failed "to give any signal" because 
such evidence as there is in the record in any way favorable 
to plaintiff concerning signals is only negative evidence, 
whereas the members of the train crew are very positive 
that a whistle was blown prior to the starting of the train 
across the highway, and the engine bell was rung contin· 
uously. Disregarding this question of failure to give a sig· 
nal, however, the instruction would have allowed the jury 
to find that the defendant was negligent for failing to exer· 
cise care and caution "in maintaining a lookout for -approach· 
ing traffic." The evidence in the record in this case did not 
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in any manner justify an instruction to the jury upon which 
they could have found that the defendant failed to exercise 
proper care with respect to maintaining a lookout or that 
would have authorized a jury to in any way find that the 
defendant did fail to maintain a lookout for approaching 
traffic. 
A sin1ilar instruction was requested in the case of Van 
Wagoner v. Union Pacific R. Co., .. Utah .. , 186· P. 2d 293, 
and in that case the appellant assigned error because the 
trial court refused to give the instruction. This court af-
firmed the trial court and with respect to such requested 
instruction stated: 
"The next assignment advanced by appellants 
concerns the refusal of the trial court to instruct 
the jury on respondent's alleged negligence arising 
out of the train crew's failure to keep a proper look-
out. If there is any substantial evidence in the rec-
ord, the court should have submitted plaintiff's 
theory to the jury, as this court, has held that there 
is a duty upon the railroad company to keep a proper 
lookout, particularly when approaching a public 
crossing. 
"There was no direct evidence that the train 
crew was not keeping a proper lookout. On the con-
trary, the train crew testified to facts indicating a 
reasonable compliance with this requirement. * * *" 
The court then goes on to discuss some of the evidence 
that may have had a bearing upon the question of lookout, 
and then concludes: 
"* * * Under the facts and circumstances 
of this case, a failure to act in time to avoid a col-
lision does not establish a failure to look." 
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This court held in the Van Wagoner case that there 
was not sufficient evidence to warrant the court's giving 
instruction to the jury with respect to failure of the train 
crew to keep a proper lookout, yet we submit that the evi-
dence in that case was no stronger in favor of the defendant 
upon the question of lookout than it is i~ the case at bar. 
We think it is not necessary to cite any law upon the 
proposition that if any portion of a requested instruction 
'11 
is improper error cannot be assigned upon the refusal of the 
court to give the instruction as requested. 
Respondent submits that with respect to the other mat-
ters contained in plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 1, 
they were all substantially covered by other instructions 
given by the court-in fact, in the opinion of respondent, 
the court went too far in the giving of some instructions. 
For instance, in Instruction No. 7 the court stated: 
"It is a part of the duty of the operator of a 
railroad locomotive to keep his train always under 
reasonable control at crossings so as to avoid col-
lision with other vehicles lawfully using the high-
way. He has no right to assume that the crossing 
is clear, but under all circ-qmstances he must be vigi-
lant and must anticipate and expect the presence of 
others, as the use and exercise of ordinary care dic-
tates." 
The court then states that if defendant failed to use 
such care it was negligent. That instruction overlooks the 
fact that because of their difference in size and movement 
the law requires an automobile to yield the prior right of 
way to a train. That instruction would place upon the de-
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fendant the burden of avoiding collision with other vehicles 
lawfully on the highway regardless of whether the opera-
tors of those vehicles were themselves exercising due care, 
and respondent submits that the court went further than 
was warranted either by the law or the' evidence in that 
portion of Instruction No. 7. 
Instruction No. 8 covered the question of whistle and 
bell completely in spite of the fact that respondent feels that 
a lack of whistle or bell under the circumstances in this case 
could not have been the proximate cause of the accident. 
The court instructed the jury in Instruction No. 7, and 
again repeated it in No. 9, that the defendant was charged 
with the responsibility of exercis.ing reasonable care, and 
that if defendant failed to do so, such failure would be neg-
ligence. In Instruction No. 12 the court instructed the jury 
that the plaintiff had a right to presume that the defendant 
before crossing the highway would exercise reasonable care 
for motor vehicles. 
Defendant submits that the court did not err in refusing 
to give plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 1. 
Plaintiff contended throughout the trial, and seems to 
be of the same opinion on this appeal, that defendant was 
negligent because it had no light on its rear freight car. In 
Instruction No. 1 as requested by plaintiff (the only re-
quested instruction plaintiff complains about), he did- not 
request the court to instruct the jury that defendant would 
have been negligent if there was no light on the beet car, 
it would have been error to give such an instruction had one 
been requested. However, in spite of the lack of request and 
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in spite of the fact that all of plaintiff's requested instruc-
tions were substantially covered if not directly given in the 
court's instructions, plaintiff continues to argue here that 
defendant was negligent for not having a light on the beet 
car. Plaintiff's counsel argued to that effect before the 
jury, and on page 22 of his brief cites an A. L. R. note which 
seems to indicate that such car should have had a light on 
it. The cases cited under the A. L. R. note do not support 
such a statement except in one or two instances, and in most 
if not all of such instances it vvill be found that there was 
a statute or city ordinance which required such a light. 
The quoted statement from 52 C. J. 213, Section 1811, 
does not state the rule as requiring such lights but charges 
negligence if such cars are backed over a crossing "with-
out proper lookouts, or without proper lights, or other sig-
nals or warnings * * *". (Italics ours). 
In the case at bar there was ample evidence from which 
the jury could find not only proper lookout but other signals 
and warnings-by both bell and whistle and by the flagman 
on the crossing, whose lantern was s_een at least at some 
stage of the occurrence by Mrs. Archibald, Mr. Squires and 
the patrolman as well as most of the other members of the 
train crew. 
We acknowledge as good law the rule of the case of 
Pokor·a v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292! U. S. 98, that the giving of 
statutory signals may not exhaust the duty of the· railroad 
company and that unusual conditions and circumstances 
surr<?unding the crossing may require the railroad company, 
in the exercise of due care, to do something in addition to 
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the giving of statutory signals. What that something addi-
tional should be has not been definitely set by law and it is 
left to the determination of the jury as to whether some 
additional warning should have been given, and whether 
what was done by the railroad company in attempting to give 
that additional warning complied with the railroad's duty 
in that respect if the jury should determine that the circum-
stances required such additional 'varning. Here the jury 
could have found that Belnap supplied that additional warn-
ing and could have found that plaintiff would have seen such 
warning if he had been driving at an appropriate speed with 
his car under control with a proper lookout ahead. 
One thing which appellant did not mention in connec-
tion with the case of Illinois Central R. Co. v. Davis, 3~2. F. 
2d 23·2, cited on page 27 of his brief, was that there the 
plaintiff contended the railroad company should have done 
more even to comply with statutory provisions. The court 
held that the questioned statute did not apply and reversed 
the trial court's judgment for plaintiff saying: 
"Under the law there should have been a di-
rected verdict for defendant/' 
In the case of Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Folkes, 18 
S. E. 2d 309, cited on page 28 of appellant's brief, plaintiff 
was a guest in the car and the question on appeal was 
whether the negligence of the driver was a matter of law 
the sole proximate cause of the accident, and the Virginia 
court held that that was a question for the jury to decide. 
In the California case of Peri v. Los Angeles Junction 
Ry., 137 P. 2d 441, the plaintiffs were passengers and it was 
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not in any way contended that they could be charged with 
contributory negligence. The sole question was with respect 
to the negligence of the defendant, or whether the negligence 
of the driver was the sole proximate cause. Had the driver 
in that case been the plaintiff the question would have been 
different. In that case there was a wigwag which was. out 
of order. The wigwag was known to the driver, and he tes-
tified directly that he relied on it. Also, in that case there 
was fog limiting visibility to approxiraately lS feet, and 
even a light could have been seen only 30 feet. Even then 
the court said that considering the slow speeds involved 
a whistle or bell could have avoided the accident. 
In the case at bar there was no fog and no wigwag bell 
to be relied on by the plaintiff, and in spite of appellant's 
arguments to the contrary, there is ample evidence from 
which the jury could have concluded that it was a bright 
moonlight night, and in addition there was a flagman on 
the crossing waving a lantern. 
In the Peri case the California court did not say that 
there should have been lights or flares but that under the 
circumstances there existing, considering the fog and the 
I 
wigwag being out of order, the conditions required some-
thing in addition to the usual statutory signals, and it was 
for the jury to determine what that something was. The 
court stated: 
"* * * It is only reasonable to say that the 
necessity, nature, character and extent of the warn-
ings such as flagmen, flares, lights and signals, 
shifts with the circumstances of the particular case 
and is a question of fact in each case." 
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In a subsequent California case, Heintz v. Southern 
Pacific, 147 P. 2d 621, wherein there was no question of fog 
or other unusual conditions, the California court distin-
guished the Peri case and refused to follow it and sustained 
a nonsuit against the drive~ of the automobile, who had been 
killed in the accident. 
See also a more recent case, Martindale v. Atchison., T. 
& S. F. Ry. Co., 201 P. 2d 48, wherein the C'alifornia court 
again distinguishes and refuses to follow the Peri case and 
sustained judgments in favor of the defendant. 
CONCLUSIO-N 
Respondent earnestly contends that the trial court did 
no_t commit error in any of the particulars charged by ap-
pellant and that under the Haarstrich case, as well as other 
Utah cases which involved accidents similar to the case at 
bar, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
A. U. MINER, 
Of Counsel. 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
July 1, 1949. 
B;RYAN P. LEVERIC'H, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
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